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ABSTRACT
A theory, taxonomy, and model of 52 emergent social units are 
developed from archival data which describe activities during the 
emergency phase of 12 natural disasters. The thesis builds directly on 
Kreps* (1983a; 1983b; 1984a; 1984b; 1984c) ongoing study of
organization. Kreps' theory of organization draws on Weber's 
distinction between individual (historical) and general 
(transhistorical) ideal types and the notions of structure and 
collective representations developed respectively by Simmel and 
Durkheim. Kreps defines four individually necessary and collectively 
sufficient elements of organization— domain (D), tasks (T), human and 
material resources (R), and activities (A) — which combine to form a 
taxonomy of 24 logically possible forms of organization related by way 
of a continuum. No assumptions are made regarding element arrangement 
in time and space. Each empirically grounded pattern points 
analytically to the autonomy and unity of social action and social order 
as both relate to disaster. Kreps expresses the underlying unity 
between goal oriented rational action (D T R A) and elemental collective 
behavior (A R T D) by devising a metric which captures the 
transitivities between the poles of the continuum (D T R A to A R T D). 
The metric allows for the modeling of 24 forms of organization 
represented in the taxonomy. The model of emergent units points to the 
critical role of origins and spatial-temporal features in the process of 
organization. The thesis closes by discussing key attributes of 
emergent units, the relationship between emergent units and more 
established processes of organization, and the need for a substantive 
merger between collective behavior and organization perspectives.
viii
DISASTER AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: 
ORGANIZATION AND EMERGENT UNITS
INTRODUCTION
The thesis which follows builds directly on Kreps1 (1983a? 1983b?
1984a? 1984b? 1984c) ongoing study of organization in which he
develops as unique strategy for advancing knowledge about disaster and 
the social order. Drawing from Kreps1 data file of 423 cases of 
organization from 15 disaster events, I examine 52 cases of emergent 
social units. The remaining cases in his file are responses enacted by 
established social units of various types (e.g., military units, 
emergency relevant public bureaucracies). In effect, I adopt for 
purposes of analysis, Kreps* perspective on organization and use his 
taxonomy as a tool for interpreting emergent social unit responses in 
disaster.
The following case description is one example from my study of what 
is interpreted as an instance of emergent organization. The example 
highlights two dimensions of Kreps* definition of disaster which 
distinguishes them as sociological events (1). These events have 
impacts (2) on social units (3). The social units enact responses (4) 
that are related to these impacts (Kreps, 1984b). More important, the 
case description best communicates Kreps* framework and the way it is 
used in this study to interpret responses enacted by emergent social 
units, both key dimensions of disaster. It illustrates what we call a 
D-R-A-T pattern at the origins of organization. The domain of this 
response relates to the care of victims.
2
3A temporary morgue is set up after a tornado. The county 
coroner is not a doctor but a local funeral director. He has 
no coroner*s office, no staff, and no morgue. Normally, he 
simply signs autopsies after they are completed by hospital 
pathologists. After the tornado, spokesmen for the only local 
hospital say their staff cannot handle those killed by the 
event. They are equipped to handle only five cases per hour.
A discussion by the coroner and two pathologists at the 
hospital leads to a decision to set up a temporary morgue.
So, four hours following the tornado the coroner calls an 
acquaintance who works at the local YMCA and requests use of 
the facility for the morgue. The YMCA director accedes to the 
request (D). The coroner, the two pathologists, a licensed 
embalmer, and a marine recruiter go to the YMCA. The YMCA 
provides several rooms and a couple of staff. Thus, key 
participants and material resources are mobilized next (R).
An hour later airbulances start bringing bodies to the morgue? 
people come to the morgue concerned about the missing? bodies 
start to be identified? local ministers who stop or come by 
with concerned residents start attending to the needs of the 
bereaved. It is evident that interdependent actions are 
taking place, but there is no discemable structure of 
activities (A). The need for "organization" is expressed by 
the key participants. Gradually a simple task structure 
emerges. The identified and unidentified dead are physically 
separated, with the two pathologists attending to them. The 
licensed embalmer and marine recruiter take on paper work 
tasks. The coroner maintains liaison with the hospital, 
funeral homes, and next of kin. Two ministers are asked to 
remain and attend to the needs of the bereaved at another 
location in the building (T). The morgue closes about 24-30 
hours after it opens. All bodies are identified and 
processed.
This observed instance of organization, as well as the others in 
our analyses, points to a revered and important implication about human 
action and the social order (Alexander, 1982). Clearly, we are 
observing human action. But, as Simmel indicated long ago, such action 
is enacted in ways that reflect alternative "forms of sociation" (Kreps, 
1984a). The subtleties of the forms are captured by using Kreps* 
strategy for comparative study of the responses of social units.
But what is organization? And, what are the component parts of a
4"pattern" or "form" of organization? Organization is defined by Kreps 
as both process and thing (unit). As process, organization is the 
action of initiating, maintaining, and suspending structure— in the 
present case, instances of disaster relevant structure of human 
populations. The term "process" clearly means the passage of time in 
regard to organizational development and observation. In this sense, 
Kreps emphasizes the temporal ordering of the social properties of 
organization. Posited as a thing, organization is identified by the 
co-presence of four analytically distinct elements. The elements 
(domain, tasks, human and material resources, activities) are therefore 
individually necessary and collectively sufficient for organization to 
exist. They are treated as "structural" (objective) rather than 
"individual" (subjective) characteristics of organization (Mayhew, 1980; 
1981). By structural, I am referring to them as emergent dimensions of 
action and order. They are, in effect, definable and interpretable as 
social properties sui generis (Durkheim, 1947).
Each emergent unit in this study has a distinguishable pattern of 
relationships among these four elements. The subtleties of the patterns 
are captured by using Kreps' typology which, by use of a factorial 
design, points to twenty four logically possible pattern arrangements 
(see Table 1).
Domains and tasks are interpreted as collective representations of 
organized social action. By collective representation Kreps means 
generalized information (external given to individuals) which relates in 
essential ways to time and energy use in the performance of
5TABLE Is Taxonomy of Organized Responses
Organizational greps.' Bpecgeo£-Ifoit
Forms Bata. File File
Frequencies Frequgaci.es
D-T-R-A 165 3
D-T-A-R 6 1
D-R-A-T 28 3
D-R-T-A 53 6
D-A-R-T 2 *
D-A-T-R 1 *
T-R-A-D 22 3
T-RHD-A 4 1
T-A-D-R * *
T-A-R-D * *
T-D-R-A 1 *
T-D-A-R * *
R-A-D-T 16 3
R-A-T-D 11 2
R-D-T-A 66 13
R-D-A-T 12 7
R-T-D-A 6 2
R-T-A-D 12 1
A-D-T-R 2 *
A-D-R-T * *
A-T-D-R 2 *
A-T-R-D 4 1
A-R-D-T 6 3
A-R-T-D  i_  1.
TOTAL 423 52
* Indicates Forms of Organized Response not yet located.
6activities— indicating what is taking place and how. Others (e.g., 
Staelser, 1962; Thompson, 1967) have pointed to the intra- and 
inter-subjective meaning of collective representations that are 
historically specific. But in keeping with the structural theme, I 
emphasize the material properties of collective representations which 
take the form of information about social actions (communications, 
organizational vocabularies, formal mandates, laws). Human and material 
resources and activities are the other material properties of 
organization. The elements are defined as follows.
Dogging
Domain is a collective representation of a broader system (e.g., 
community) function of an organized response (Thompson, 1967; Wenger, 
1978). In the disaster context, domains identify actual or threatened 
impacts as legitimate spheres of social action. The several types of 
domains (see Table 2) encompass pre-, trans-, and post-disaster time 
periods. They are evidenced by the communications of direct 
participants and others related at the boundaries of enacting social 
units. A processual view of domain is centrally important. Such a view 
suggests that in some situations the domain of organization may be 
evident before the event while in other situations, domain is a social 
construction of the emergency period. As a system property, domain has 
normative import, specifying both internal and external legitimations 
(via the content of information) of what participants in a response will 
and will not do. But the course of legitimation is also processual.
7TABLE 2: Emergent Unit Response Domains
DomainOVpe Frequencies
Hazard-vulnerability analysis 1
Disaster preparedness, planning and training 1
Issuance of predictions and warnings 1
Dissemination of predictions and warnings 1
Evacuation 4
Mobilization of emergency personnel and resources 5
Search and rescue 3
Medical care 3
Providing victim basic needs 9
Damage needs and assessment and inventory of 1
available resources
Damage control 2
Public information 3
Local governance 1
Coordination and control 8
Reconstruction of physical structures 3
Reconstruction planning 4
Other _JL
TOTAL 52
8That is, there need not be a simultaneous internal-external occurance of 
domain legitimation. For instance, response participants may define and 
adopt a particular domain type (care of victims as noted in the previous 
exairple). This constitutes internal legitimation. Following this, 
relevant others (YMCA director) may provide external legitimation in one 
or several ways (e.g., supplying resources, referring victims, honoring 
requests for needed facilities).
Tasks
Tasks are collective representations of how a domain is enacted and 
are communicated most pointedly by direct participants. The number of 
tasks for a given domain may range from few to many. It is however, the 
logical independence of tasks from domain that is essential to the 
notion that organization is a bounded system. As defined above, domain 
very clearly depicts open system dynamics, for its existence is 
predicated on both internal and external representation. Tasks, 
however, reveal more clearly the closed system information related to 
the structuring and restructuring of human and material resources and 
activities (Thompson, 1967). Recognizing the independence of tasks and 
domains is essential to a process model of organization as well. That 
is, tasks may be present following or prior to domain; and in either 
case, they may be pre-established or emerge as the event develops.
Jteeu. and .Material-Resources
People and their many attributes, commodities, and equipment are 
the "raw materials" of any instance of organization (Zurcher and Show,
91981). Termed human and material resources, each may be controlled 
internally within a response— further depicting the boundedness of 
organization— or accessible through facilitating relationships. In 
either case, they ultimately combine with the remaining elements when 
organization is enacted. The relevance of human and material resources, 
which often converge in great abundance following a disaster, is 
socially determined. They may mobilize before or after impact, and may 
precede or follow the existence of domain and tasks in the process of 
organization •
Activities
Activities are interdependent actions which articulate the raw 
materials of organization (human and material resources) with collective 
representations (domains and tasks) of what is happening. It is 
important to note that while activities constitute the actions of human 
beings, they are "no more or less analytically important than the 
remaining three elements" of organization (Kreps, 1984c, p.8). In this 
sense, activities relate co-equally to organization as both unit and 
process.
Kreps also identifies three system states of organization; 
initiation, maintenance, and suspension. Each state exhibits a pattern 
of relationships among the four elements. Those initiated by domain and 
tasks (D T) reflect goal oriented rational action or formal rationality 
( D T R A  interpreted as "perfect" formal rationality). Responses 
dominated by activities or resources (A R) reflect an elemental form of 
organization often referred to in disaster literature as collective
10
behavior (Kreps, 1984a). By definition, the system state of initiation 
ends when the last element falls into place making the transition from 
initiation to maintenance one of logical necessity. Because initiation 
and suspension are characterized by attribute values (i.e., 
presence-absence of the four elements) the degree of presence is 
centrally important. Indeed, it is the threshold judgements of presence 
that are critical. During maintenance, organization is contingent upon 
the four elements* presence in degree. Thus, the more important task is 
to account for property variances that may lead to pattern 
reconstruction or suspension. That is, if an element related 
contingency emerges (e.g., a piece of equipment is damaged, participants 
are lost, domain or tasks become unclear or questioned) the problem may 
be resolved through restructuring of the elements and the response 
continues until the demand is met or some new contingency appears. If 
the contingency is not resolved, the relevant element sets off the 
process of suspension. For both situations, judgements become critical 
in terms of absence thresholds. The following case description is one 
example from my study of what is interpreted as task related 
restructuring. That is, property variances in the task structure set 
off the process. The response has a D R T A initiation pattern. The 
element contingency relates to the loss of a clearly defined task 
structure.
The domain of the response involves the provision of medical 
care. The community has been impacted by a major earthquake 
(short forewarning). Sometime prior to the event, the local 
Civil Defense, in conjunction with disaster preparedness 
planning, designates the Director of a regional research 
laboratory as Emergency Health Director. The current
11
laboratory Director, being new to the position, is unaware of 
the appointment and associated responsibilities. Two days 
following the earthquake, the C.D. contacts the Director. He 
is told to report to the nearest city administration building.
Upon arrival, a C.D. member outlines for him the response 
domain. The director is in charge of coordinating key 
community medical care services (D). Following the briefing, 
approximately 30 nurses are mobilized and placed under the 
direction of the Director (R). Together, they begin to work 
on a task structure and define procedures for typhoid 
vaccination (T). Next, he and the nurses split into groups, 
go out to several area clinics, and begin vaccination 
activities (A). Following the enactment of activities, the 
Director is confronted with a water problem. The Director has 
not anticipated, and thus is not prepared to handle the task 
contingency which demands specific technical knowledge and 
resources. The task structure becomes unclear and temporarily 
problematic. The contingency is resolved when the Director 
seeks advice from relevant sources and is subsequently given 
several alternate plans from which to choose in order to deal 
with the water problem. The inspection of restaurants, a new 
response task, is not problematic for he is able to mobilize 
in a short period of time a group of qualified inspectors (R) 
and, in effect, tells them the specifics of their duties.
Related activities are carried out and both task demands are 
met (A). Vaccination activities continue at least seven 
weeks. After 38,000 typhoid shots are given, the supervision 
of the Emergency Health Director is no longer needed.
Prior to suspension, the response pattern changes from D-R-T-A at
initiation to D-T-R-A at the maintenance of organization.
The parallels between Kreps' and my own study are many. As
mentioned previously, I utilize Kreps' data source which conprises
archival data in the form of transcribed interviews provided by the
Disaster Research Center at Ohio State University. In addition, I adopt
Kreps' perspective on organization and taxonomy of responses. Our
studies hold to the tradition of disaster studies in that each is
concerned with how disaster and the social order are related (Prince,
1920; Turner, 1967). As researchers of disaster and organization we
are studying social events, units of analysis, and struggling with
12
issues of concern in each field. But the perspectives we hold toward 
each represent significant points of departure from the traditions of 
disaster and organization research.
First, we believe that the field's attention to the social order 
makes it (disaster) a logical interest of mainstream sociology. As we 
aim to get a better handle on such concepts as disaster, collective 
behavior, and organization we realize, along with Alexander (1982), that 
such concepts are related one way or the other to matters of action and 
order.
Second, we have divorced ourselves from the indifference in 
mainstream sociology to the construction of taxonomies. Enbracing 
taxonomy is, in our judgement, the best way to conceptually relate human 
vulnerability and social organization.
Kreps' perspective on and taxonomy of organization departs from 
previous and contemporary conceptions and measurements found in the 
literature (Etzioni, 1964; Pugh, 1978; Hall, 1982; McKelvey, 1982; 
and others)• Kreps' views the dearth of definitional and taxonomic work 
on organization as problematic. In this sense, he does not view 
organization as a given characteristic of a social unit but that which 
is to be defined and explained. In addition, his perspective goes 
beyond the traditional static conception of organization by emphasizing 
both process and structure.
My study of 52 cases of emergent organization is not, however, a 
replication of Kreps' work. It is important, therefore, to highlight 
what are interpreted as complementary differences which relate
13
respectively to the nature of emergent and more established 
organization, the role of origins, and the incorporation of key 
spatial-temporal model variables.
The unique feature of emergent unit enactment— development within 
circumscribed time and space and a short lived duration— make emergent 
units in natural disaster both interesting examples of process and to 
the extent accessible, amenable to joint observation and analysis.
Unlike other types of social units, emergent units in this analysis 
transpired within days and sometimes hours. And, as Gamson (1975) 
suggests, the former type often take years to develop. Because of their 
lengthy enactment, researchers are often unable to observe and analyze, 
particularly during the early stages, the internal and external dynamics 
of organization. In this sense, my analysis of 52 emergent social units 
in the disaster context further contributes to our understanding of the 
process of organization.
Qie could argue, therefore, that all instances of organization are 
said to emerge. However, the term "emergent" is applicable to my unit 
of analysis in lieu of their temporal and spatial features mentioned 
above. In effect, the term emergent is used as a summative concept 
(Dubin, 1978) which emphasizes the key feature of these instances of 
organization.
The thrust of my thesis is to identify other distinct features as 
well, namely those which are comparable to features of more established 
social units. To begin to address this basic question, I direct the 
reader to the marginals for the 52 cases presented on Table 1 (pg.5).
14
Here, we note taxonomy frequencies for Kreps' 423 cases and the 52 
emergent units. It is evident that documented patterns in each study 
include more goal oriented rational action (D T R A), elemental 
collective behavior (A R T D) and the permutations between. From this I 
begin the argument against traditional assumptions which define emergent 
social units as "means" (activities, resources) related, "collective 
behavior" (Turner and Killian, 1972), or "relatively unorganized" 
responses (Mileti et al., 1975). In this sense, my work holds to Kreps' 
immediate objective which is to contribute to the merging of collective 
behavior and organizational perspectives on action and order in the 
disaster context.
Unlike Kreps, I incorporate temporal and spatial variables which 
highlight the dynamics of the origins of emergent social units. Since 
our data do not allow for hypothesis testing, my study is a process of 
exploratory modeling. From the model of emergent social units (see 
Figure 1) I portray findings as they relate to emergent units in 
disaster and I suspect, other forms of organization as well.
In sum, ny objective is to (1) add information related to the 
development of a taxonomy of organization and emergent social units that 
stem directly from Kreps* perspective of organization, and (2) analyze 
the process of organization for 52 units in order to assess further the 
role of origins.
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RELATED THEORY ON EMERGENT SOCIAL UNITS
The notions of both structure and process emphasized in Kreps*
(1983a; 1983b; 1984a; 1984b; 1984c) work have been developed from
the classics as well as contemporary works. It is important to
remember, however, that Kreps* perspective on organization and
collective behavior represents a significant departure from the
conceptual and theoretical traditions of each field. In the section
which follows these differences will become clearer as I further examine
respectively the notions of (1) structure, (2) collective behavior vis a
vis organization (structure), and (3) space-time factors. These notions
are reflected in the works of Simmel, Durkheim, and Weber and more
recent scholars such as Smelser, Gamson, Skocpal, and Giddens. The
ideas in this analysis which these notions inform have direct
implications for our perspective on organization and the analysis of
emergent social units.
In Kantian manner, Sinmel (1965) intimates that the form of social
action (i.e., knowledge) is notably distinct from its content.
Knowledge, for example initially appears as a means in the 
struggle for existence, but it comes to be cultivated for its 
own sake autonomously, as happens in science (Martindale,
1982, p.228).
That is, Simmel refers to the analytical distinction between the form 
and content of inter-human action. In his discussion of "sociability", 
Simmel ties a notion of structure to the identification of structural
16
17
elements as they relate to social action. But how is the content of 
social action to be denoted?
Abel (1970) clarifies the Simmelian distinction between form and 
content as something other than that which is abstract or concrete, 
structural or material, formal or substantive. Instead, 
forms-of-sociation in human interaction constitute a "mode of 
reciprocity between persons manifest in their actions toward each other, 
their attitudes, and their mutual evaluations" (Abel, 1970, p.84).
Simmel intimates, therefore, that "forms-of-sociation" are patterned 
social actions comprised of structural elements. Are then, collective 
representations (domain, tasks) structural elements of human 
interaction?
Durkheim (1947) said that collective representations represent "the 
totality of beliefs and sentiments common to the average citizens of the 
same society" (Durkheim, 1947, p.49). Because these beliefs are 
interpreted holistically they are, therefore, distinguished by their 
exteriority and constraint (Martindale, 1981) and found in the 
solidarity features of society.
Collective representations constitute a reality sui generis. That 
is, they are more than the summation of individual attitudes and 
beliefs. But this critical feature of collective representations proved 
problematic for Durkheim. In effect, he was unable to distinguish them 
as either intersubjective meanings or social facts (structure). Perhaps 
he was simply being flexible about substantive problems of action and 
orders
18
Moreover, it does not change with each generation, but, on the 
contrary, it connects successive generations with one another.
It is, thus, an entirely different thing from particular 
consciences, although it can be realized only through them 
(Durkheim, 1947, p.80).
Given the breadth and nature of the problem Durkheim was struggling 
with, many since him have questioned the efficacy of classifying 
collective representations as social structures. If one assumes that 
both "individual" and "group" are analytical rather than concrete terms, 
and that neither has ontological primacy, then collective 
representations can be seen as having external (material) and internal 
(subjective) dimensions (Alexander, 1982). I feel that these are 
reasonable assumptions.
The tradition of collective behavior studies is indicative of the 
debate between collective representations as social facts (structure) or 
essentially individual expressions. The tendency has been for 
collective behaviorists to analyze emergent social units in 
psychological terms. From earlier theorists (Lebon, 1960 reprint) to 
relatively contemporary exemplars (Lang and Lang, 1961? Smelser, 1962) 
the distinction is made between social movements, crowds, and mass 
behavior and, on the other hand, conventional or more formal groups and 
organizations. Each has been described as collective representations or 
associations. However, not only are the participants of each viewed as 
different "species" (Gamson, 1975) but their forms are interpreted as 
distinctive and "relatively enduring" as well.
For example, Lang and Lang (1961) compare collective behavior and 
more formal social action and suggest that they differ in terms of form
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and content. They argue that participants in collective behavior 
respond without the advantage of social expectations or the guidance of 
social structures (Weller and Quarantelli, 1973). By implication, this 
means that a structural analysis of emergent units is unlikely. Lang 
and Lang contend that most structures associated with conventional units 
are "either lacking or not determining factors" when applied to emergent 
ones (Lang and Lang, 1961, p. 13).
Staelser (1962) provides a different interpretation by pointing to a 
similarity between collective and more formal behavior. In doing so, he 
outlines a typology of generalized beliefs associated with collective 
representations for they reflect the normative content of collective
behavior. The types are defined as follows:
(1) hysteria, which transforms an ambiguous situation 
into an absolutely potent generalized threat;
(2) wish-fulfillment, which reduces ambiguity by positing 
absolutely plausible generalized facilities;
(3) hostility, which involves removing some agent or 
object perceived as a generalized threat;
(4) value oriented beliefs, which envision the 
reconstruction of a threatened value system; and
(5) norm-oriented beliefs, which envision the 
reconstruction of a threatened normative structure.
None, however, parallel Durkheim*s definition of collective 
representations because Staelser views generalized beliefs as 
"peculiarities . . . that activate people for participation in
episodes of collective behavior" (Smelser, 1962, P.80). The content of 
such beliefs are interpreted by Staelser as "problems" which are then 
elevated to a workable level. In addition this process of activation is
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viewed as normal and rational. The difference, though, is that
collective behavior produces generalized beliefs which are spontaneous
and lack continuity. Gamson (1975) calls the process in which they
emerge "short circuiting" because actors in collective behavior usually
move from the abstract phase of problem formulation to the source of
attention. In this sense, emergent social units enact a predictable
jump between these two aspects of action in the absence of a clearly
defined task structure.
In sum, Staelser's statements on collective behavior point to two
contradicting assumptions about emergent social units. First, though he
fails to cite Weber, his subjectivist interpretation of collective and
more formal behavior reflects the Weberian logic of formal rationality
(e.g., domain precedes activities).
Present in all collective behavior is some kind of belief that 
prepares the participants for action. . . . This preparing
function is implicit in our view of generalized beliefs as 
determinants that add their value in the process that builds 
up to an episode of collective behavior (Staelser, 1962, p.83).
His interpretation of social behavior suggests similarities between
collective behavior and more formal behavior in terms of organization
pattern. That is, both emergent and more formal social units in
disaster may be more "ends" (domain,tasks) as opposed to "means"
(activities, resources) oriented. But as Table 1 (pg.5) suggests,
emergent and established units cover the entire range of 24 logical
possibilities in terms of organization pattern. On the other hand, and
perhaps in keeping more with traditional views of collective behavior,
Staelser implies the improbability of instances of organization in regard
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to various forms of collective behavior.
But what is formal rationality and how does it relate to patterns 
of organization? Formal rationality is one of four types of 
"rationality" investigated by Weber (Kalberg, 1980). Manifest in social 
actionr formal rationality develops in specific spheres of life (e.g., 
economic, science) and is associated with a bureaucratic form of 
domination. Formally rational procedures legitimate practical 
calculations and employ techniques "with little regard to persons".
They operate with calculations of "the most precise and efficient means 
for the resolution of problems by ordering them under universal and 
abstract regulations" (Kalberg, 1980, p. 1158).
In the disaster context, the interpretation and application of this 
concept suggests the predominance of domain initiated responses. Given 
Krepsr four essential elements of organization, the pattern of 
development most representative of Weber's notion of formal rationality 
is the following;
Domain— Tasks— Human and Material Resources— Activities
(Kreps, 1983a)
This pattern (D T R A) points to Weber's broader notion of goal oriented 
rational action. Activities are logically predicated by resource 
mobilization, task development, and domain respectively. Deviations 
from this pattern are interpreted as increasingly less formally rational 
and less routine. Deviations are also considered by some as less 
"efficient" as a consequence of deviation (Price, 1968). Weber's 
conception of goal oriented rational action, or formal rationality 
provides an interesting interpretation of organized responses in a
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disaster emergency period. For instance, one would suppose that domain 
or task initiated responses would occur most often— in established as 
well as emergent social units— and be time and energy saving. As has 
been shown (see Table 1, pg.5), the data do not support that 
presumption.
Contemporary organization literature provides several exanples of
researchers who make assumptions similar to Weber and Smelser regarding
the rational nature of organizations. The statement by Etzioni (1961)
is a classic example. He defines organization as:
a human grouping deliberately constructed to seek specific 
goals . • . organizations are characterized by: (1)
divisions of labor, power, and communication responsibilities, 
divisions which are not randomly or traditionally patterned, 
but deliberately planned; (2) the presence of one or more 
power centers vdiich control and direct them toward its goals; 
these power centers also continuously review the 
organization's performance and repattem its structure, where 
necessary, to increase its efficiency; (3) substitution of 
personnel . . ." (Etzioni, 1961, p.3).
From Etzioni's definition one might infer that emergent groups are the
result of conscious planning, not the specific context from which they
develop. Context, however, interpreted here as origins has a critical
role in the subsequent development of organization. More important,
those pointing to formal rationality (as Etzioni does) usually assume
the existence of organization, while those pointing to collective
behavior usually presume its absence. Although both assumptions are
unwarranted in the disaster context, appearances may be deceiving in any
context.
Few researchers of social movements or organization would disagree 
with the idea that all social units have origins. Yet, recognition of
23
the significance of origins in the process of organization varies 
greatly. From the works of writers who do recognize the critical role 
or orgins I infer not only the relevance of organization context but 
spatial and temporal features as each relate to emergent social unit 
enactment.
For examplef Kimberly et al.f (1980) assert that the "life cycle" 
concept of organization compels the scientist to acknowledge seriously 
and appreciate the importance of origins. They argue that 
organizations, like biological entities, have an identifiable history 
and context from which they develop. These origins may, in turn, inpact 
the structure or pattern of organization in one or more of its system 
states (Paige, 1975; Kimberly et al., 1980; Skocpol, 1981; McKelvey,
1982).
Similarly, Skocpol (1981), who adopts a structural approach in her
study of social revolutions, gives particular emphasis to the origins
and structural features of organizational environments. According to
Skocpol, a purposive or individualistic analysis assumes the process of
organization to be the direct result of individual decision making.
And, the resulting interpretation tends to be highly misleading when
presenting the process and outcomes of historical instances, as well as
their causes.
Developing the point further, Skocpol asserts that
successful social revolutions probably emerge from different 
macro-structural and historical contexts than do either failed 
social revolutions or political transformations that are not 
acconpanied by transformations of class relations (Skocpol,
1981, p.5).
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Her treatment of and emphasis on the origins and historical context of 
social revolutions touch on matters which are central to the disaster 
context. In addition, Skocpol1 s perspective resonates with that of the 
population ecologists (Hannon and Freeman, 1977; McKelvey, 1983) in her 
emphasis on "ecological context". That is, social unit (emergent unit, 
social revolution) comparability of specific instances of emergent 
social units and "of the broader social network of the focal unit is a 
necessary condition for new (emergent) organization" (Francis and Kreps, 
1984, p.32).
Weller and Quarantelli1s (1973) article highlights a typology of 
collective bdiavior and suggests the significance of origins for each 
type. The typology points to the source of and depicts three kinds of 
emergent collectivities. Their concentration on systems of norms and 
social relationships reflects the potentially routine nature of some 
elements of organization. They consider the source of these elements 
"with respect to the social setting in which behavior takes place" 
(Weller and Quarantelli, 1972, p.679). Unfortunately, they do not 
pursue the matter further. Weller and Quarantelli leave essentially 
unspecified the sources of social norms and social relationships.
Skocpol's (1981) analysis also incorporates a critical theoretical 
component to which the disaster context commands our attention; the 
concept of time or what she calls "world time". Here, world time is 
utilized as a key contextual variable and comprises the peripheral and 
transitory environment of social phenomena.
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Ch the one hand, there are the structures of the world 
capitalist economy and the international states system, within 
which individual nations are situated in different positions.
And on the other hand, there are changes and transmissions in 
world time which affect both the overall world contexts within 
which revolutions occur and the particular models and options 
for action that can be borrowed from abroad by revolutionary 
leadership (Skocpol, 1981, p.23).
Skocpol implies, therefore, that emergent units may and frequently 
do develop within the context of other disaster relevant organization. 
Each organization may reflect relatively similar or dissimilar patterns 
of organization. Second, assuming that the patterning of organization 
may change over time, those observed immediately following the disaster 
(her referent is revolution) may significantly differ from those 
observed during the later phases of the emergency period. Thus the 
actual time a group emerges may operate as an influential variable 
regarding the pattern of origins and maintenance.
Giddens (1979) argues that the concept of time is involved in any 
model of a patterning process. In regard to organization, this opinion 
would necessitate a dynamic view of the process. But as Giddens 
suggests, most theorists don't incorporate time as a variable when 
referring to social structures. This is particularly characteristic of 
functionalist perspectives. For them, time has traditionally been 
associated with process and structure with stability. The association 
reflects one of two tendencies; either the assurnption of change or 
presunption that social interactions may exist in "static stability" 
(Giddens, 1979, p.202). Any identifiable pattern of interaction must be 
located within a given time period because "only when examined over time
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do they form patterns at all" (Giddens, 1979, p.202)• In addition, a 
static analysis of social structures is not verifiable. "There is 
simply no way in which a static analysis can actually be carried out; 
the study of social activity invokes the lapse of time just as the 
activity itself does" (Giddens, 1979, p. 199).
Giddens also stresses the importance of spatial factors in any 
analysis, though it too is frequently given short shrift in theory 
building efforts. The reasons for omission are not entirely clear, but 
Giddens highlights a few possibilities. For example, socio-theoretical 
exclusions of the concept may result from a fear of attributing 
geographical determinism. On the other hand, many researchers disregard 
the importance of spatial variables because they assume an image of 
structural or environmental space as given. By doing so, each fail to 
realize that spatial factors reflect more than the distance between two 
objects or persons, geographical locations, physical environments, 
settings, or any combination of these. In the disaster context, the 
spatial and environmental characteristics of a disaster are likely to 
include those elements which are "routinely drawn upon by social actors 
in the sustaining of communication" (Giddens, 1979, p.207).
The concepts of time and space are interpreted as central to the 
definition and explanation of the process of organization. Indeed, the 
analysis to follow incorporates two preliminary variables which are, 
respectively, spatial and temporal. Related findings point to their 
potential contributions to our knowledge of emergent organization. In 
sum, the notions of rationality, collective behavior, space and time are
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interpreted as significant for the form and content of emergent 
organization. The following section includes a discussion of how each 
of these dimensions are incorporated in exploratory modeling of the 
origins, maintenance, and suspension of 52 instances of emergent 
organization that were previously identified by Kreps.
MEASUREMENT AND MODEL OF EMERGENT SOCIAL UNITS
In the following section, details are provided on the measurement 
of variables which characterize the 52 emergent social units. The 
variables point to dimensions of organization discussed in the previous 
section and are incorporated in exploratory modeling of emergent 
organization. I begin by describing respectively Kreps* data source, 
event selection, and data production requirements of the model. Next, 
starting with exogeneous variables, I discuss blocks of model variables 
in the order of their arrangement (see Figure 1).
The theory and model of emergent social units relate to earlier 
studies by the Disaster Research Center (DRC of the Ohio State 
University) which focused on social action during the emergency phase of 
selected natural disasters. The DRC traditionally sent out research 
teams to disaster sites. These teams gathered any and all information 
possible via personal interviews with participants and various types of 
documents which depict the actions of social units. The data were not 
collected with any given theoretical framework in mind, thus, interviews 
were, in most cases, unstructured. Essentially, efforts were made to 
document action sequences of events during the emergency period of 
natural disasters. The original data are stored in the DRC's 
well-maintained archives in the form of transcribed interviews and 
documents.
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As any disaster researcher knows, the environment for data 
collection is far from ideal (Drabek, 1970), It is clear, therefore, 
that the way the initial studies were conducted by the DRC (1963-1970) 
influence the nature or quality of compiled information. For example, 
researchers selected participants of disaster relevant established 
organizations (e.g., RED Cross, police departments) as principle 
interviewees because their involvement was expected, they were 
available, and they were cooperative. A selection process of this type 
prohibits the disclosure of other comparably significant disaster 
responses, notably emergent social units engaged in various domains. 
Notwithstanding this data collection bias, information on important 
emergent units often became available and was collected on site.
Disaster events examined by Kreps were a sample of these initial 
DRC studies. His selection procedure reflects both purposive and quota 
sampling strategies (Babbie, 1973). Data production continued until an 
N of 423 cases was obtained. Efforts ended with a sample of 15 events 
drawing from 1,062 interviews. Table 3 lists the sample of events, 
number of responses and interviews associated with the 52 emergent 
social units. I have re-analyzed all interviews (transcribed) related 
to the 52 emergent units for purposes of generating the model reported 
in Figure 1.
Figure 1 points to the data production requirements of the 
exploratory model that has been developed. First, empirical patterns of 
origins, maintenance, and suspension had to be documented. Second, 
other factors which relate to these patterns were recorded
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TABLE 3: Event Name, Number of Interviews and Responses
Events frlPtecYieKS #-Responses
1. Alaska Earthquake 18 15
1964
2. Hurricane Betsy 6 5
(New Orleans), 1965
3. Hurricane Camille 7 5
(Gulf Coast) , 1969
4. Belmond, Iowa 3 1
Tornado, 1966
5. Oak Lawn Chicago, 111. 1 1
Tornado, 1967
6. Jonesboro, Ark. 7 3
Tornado, 1968
7. Topeka, Kansas 5 6
Tornado, 1966
8. Central South Colorado 3 2
Floods, 1965
9. Mankato, Minn. 4 1
Flood, 1965
10. Fairbanks, Alaska 14 9
Flood, 1967
11. Minot, North Dakota 3 3
Flood, 1969
12. Fargo, North Dakota Flood, 2 1
Flood, 1969
Totals 73 52
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(e.g., participant characteristics) as were exogeneous variables.
I have only scratched the surface of what ultimately will be 
needed, but obviously I must work within the constraints of what is 
available. In sum, the model explicitly points to the process and 
structure of organization. It gives particular emphasis to the origins 
of organization and how other factors relate to then.
My core measurement problem involved, specifically, identifying and 
recording patterns of origins in terms of the 24 logical possibilities 
highlighted by Krepsf taxonomy (see Table 1, pg.5)? then relating these 
patterns to characteristics of events (event type, type of domain), 
impacted community unit characteristics (size, disaster experience, 
relevance of military units), spatial and temporal features of 
organization (time of initiation, closeness to primary impact area), 
participant characteristics (number involved, key resources at 
initiation, social links to activity area, orientations in 
communication), complexity of social network at initiation and 
maintenance, conplexity of response (means/ends problems, task structure 
focus), reason for suspension, and length of response.
Modeling .■of...Smer.g^QtLQrg.9nigati<?o
A. Exogeneous Variables
Five exogeneous variables are included in the model. Two are 
event-impact related and three are community unit related. Recalling 
Kreps' (1984a) definition of disaster (see page 2 of text) it is 
important to keep analytically distinct the four dimensions of disaster
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and the broader system (community) in which responses are enacted. In 
this way we are better able to separate the effects of each and describe 
and explain the dynamics of social unit responses.
Each of the 52 responses emerged within the context of one of four 
types of disaster events (EVEMFTP); tornado, hurricane, earthquake, or 
flood. These events have what Kreps calls "property spaces" which are 
related to the magnitude and scope of their impact. In addition, each 
property space has physical, temporal, and spatial dimensions. Treating 
events as independent variables, I emphasize the temporal dimensions of 
inpact. That is, events were coded according to ordinal distinctions in 
their length of forewarning. Earthquakes (1), tornadoes (2), and floods 
and hurricanes (3) were coded such that higher scores on this variable 
indicate greater forewarning time.
Using Kreps' typology of disaster domains (see Table 2; ACTN) I 
identified at least seventeen distinct domains. The typology was 
collapsed in an effort to isolate those domains which were (1) 
immediately post-impact and therefore urgent and (2) whose enactment was 
less likely before the event (e.g., medical care, search and rescue). 
These domains were coded "1" (N=32) and the remaining types "0" for the 
52 cases. The decision to collapse disaster domains was based on the 
idea that emergent groups may take on more time urgent demands until 
established organizations are able to recoup and take over. Moderate 
differences were evidenced between my own and the larger study of 423 
responses. Kreps hypothesized that the timing of collective 
representation in the enactment of organization may be related to domain
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ambiguity. The correlation between organization pattern (QRG-PAT) and 
domain type (ACTN) does not, however, support this hypothesis (r=-.01; 
see Appendix 1).
C-EXP is used to measure ordinal distinctions of increasing 
community disaster experience. Variable values range from "1" no 
disasters, few threats (N=8), "2" no disasters several threats (N=30), 
"3" one or more disasters (N=12), to "4" one disaster several threats 
(N=2). The measure of community size (CCMM) was collapsed to highlight 
responses which emerged in a ”1" metropolitan (50,000+) as opposed to a 
"0" non-metropolitan area (N=26). LOCMIL is used to measure spatial 
proximity and social relevance of military units to emergent 
organization. Higher scores indicate ordinal distinctions of increasing 
relevance; "1" at some distance (N=4), "2" close proximity, no 
relevance (N=22), and "3" close proximity, relevance (N=26).
B. Organization: Initiation
The distributions in Table 1 (pg.5) provide information on the 
documented patterns of organization at initiation (QRG-PAT). The 24 
logical patterns of organization are related by way of a continuum.
Each illustrates Weber's notion of individual (historical) ideal types. 
The typology of which they are a part emphasizes Simmel's distinction 
between form and content discussed in the previous section. In order to 
express the underlying unity between collective behavior (A R T D) and 
more goal oriented rational action (formal rationality, D T R A) Kreps 
(1983b) provides a metric of organization.
Kreps gave each of the 24 organization forms a score ranging from
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"0" to "6". Capturing the transitivities from D T R A t o A R T D  was a 
key requirement for metric construction. For, as a taxonomy of social 
responses, each type points analytically to the autonomy and unity of 
action and order as both relate to disaster (Alexander, 1982). Kreps 
accomplished this objective in the following way. At one end of the 
continuum is "perfect" formal rationality; where D precedes T, R, and 
A; T precedes R, A; and R precedes A. Given one point for each 
conforming transitivity D T R A receives a score of "6" while A R T D 
receives a score of "0". The midpoint of the metric, "3", highlights 
"how the process of formal rationality and collective behavior are 
balanced in the 6 types represented" (Kreps, 1984a). In effect, Kreps' 
metric, based on the continuum, allows modeling of 24 forms of 
organization represented in the taxonomy. I use this seven level 
ordinal scale for the purposes of model building.
The spread of 52 cases presented in Table 4 is very important in 
regard to the distribution of metric values. Frequencies for QRG-PAT 
indicate that the 52 emergent units do not predominately reflect either 
more elemental collective behavior or formal rationality. Indeed, 
emergent unit patterns fill the entire range of metric values. This 
tells us that assumptions about the pattern and process of organization 
are unwarranted in the disaster context for emergent social units.
Nine measures of participant characteristics are included in the 
model. Perhaps more than any other block this group of variables 
provides insight on the social psychological aspect of organization. 
First, three dummy variables were created to emphasize the salient
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TABLE 4: Organizational Forms for Emergent Units,
Formal Rationality - Collective Behavior Metric
Organizational Logical Brrpirical
Forms Metric Forms Instances
D-T-R-A 6 1 3
D-T-A-R
D-R-T-A 5 3 7
T-D-R-A
D-R-A-T
D-A-T-R
T-R-D-A 4 5 17
T-D-A-R
R-D-T-A
D-A-R-T
T-R-A-D
T-A-D-R 3 6 12
R-D-A-T
R-T-D-A
A-D-T-R
T-A-R-D
R-A-D-T
R-T-A-D 2 5 4
A-D-R-T
A-T-D-R
R-A-T-D
A-T-R-D 1 3  6
A-R-D-T
A-R-T-D 0 1 3
Totals 24 52
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topics in the communication network of response participants, EMP 
points to responses in vdiich participants expressed a high degree of 
empathy for others (N=30). PERS isolates responses whose participants 
were concerned with victims' emotional and material loss (N=21) and CCMC 
those concerned with community damage and participant control of 
response (N=26). The N of such responses exceeds 52 and thereby 
reflects emergent units with several different focuses in communication 
network.
All responses are called emergent (no pre-event existence). Some 
however were carried out by "0" emergent groups of individuals (N=24) or 
”1" emergent groups of other groups and organizations (FOT), The number 
of participants (SIZ) was the referent for the size of the responding 
units. Measurement was as follows; "1" 9 or fewer (N=ll), "2" 10 to 20 
(N=10), "3" 21 to 50 (N=10), and "4" over 50 members (N=21).
DESTAB and TOEV are two dummy variables created to measure 
respectively the time order development of domain legitimation and task 
development. DESTAB isolates responses in which "1" internal domain 
legitimation clearly precedes external legitimation (N=36). The case 
description on page two (see Introduction) points to one example where 
internal legitimation precedes external legitimation. Similarly, TDEV 
isolates responses whose participants develop their own task structure 
(N=44) as opposed to adopting one developed by a relevant other. Case
description #118 (Appendix 2) points to a situation where participants 
develop their ovm task structure. Here, the civilian and city
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secretaries, without the aid or advise of the local Civil Defense, 
devise a simple task structure whereby they receive calls on a hotline 
and use the radio to broadcast names of missing persons. Case 
description #266 (Appendix 2) points to a response where participants 
adopt a task structure developed, initially, by a relevant other. In 
this example, the student body president goes to the university 
president for assistance in developing a task structure. For this 
instance of organization, assistance from a relevant other was critical 
for the enactment of organization.
Some response participants were aware of ongoing disaster relevant 
activity in varying degrees. Such awareness was interpreted as an 
indication of social links to dominant activity areas (SIDA) and 
analytically distinct from the measured patterns of social network at 
initiation and maintenance of organization. Most responses were judged 
as socially isolated at initiation (N=29).
TINT and PLPI are only a start on the important direction of data 
production on the process of organization. That is, I believe that 
subsequent analyzes of organization should incorporate other relevant 
spatial and temporal variables. PLPI is a dummy variable created to 
measure a response’s closeness to the primary impact area. Most (N=37) 
responses were spatially integrated. TINT measures the time of 
initiation or the ordinal distinction of when the first element of 
organization emerges. Values range from "0" more than 72 hours 
pre-impact (N=3), "1" less than 72 hours pre-impact (N=5), "2" one to 
two hours post-inpact (N=ll), "3" three to twenty four hours post-impact
39
(N=8), "4" twenty five to seventy two hours post-impact (N=15), to "5" 
beyond seventy two hours post-impact (N=10). Both TINT and PLPI are 
structural variables and represent ordinal distinctions of spatial and 
temporal location.
Instances of organization may be linked to a broader network of 
responding units in ways other than by awareness of disaster relevant 
activity (SIDA). As in Kreps1 (1983b) study, evidenced links at 
initiation (PINT) were measured in the following way: measurement began
by identifying responses that were "1" self-contained (no relationships 
represented) or "2" linked to other focal organizations at initiation 
(at local, state, or national level, N=44). The number of links 
(INLINKS) at initiation was also measured: "0" no links (N=32), "1" one
or more links (N=2Q). PINT and INLINKS were moderately correlated 
(r=.43) and each contributes unique information about social network at 
initiation of organization. PIMP and INLINKS were then combined 
(additively) to form an index of social network density at initiation 
(NINDEX1). Almost half (N=23) of the responses have a simple social 
network at initiation.
C. Organization: Maintenance
Measurement of complexity of response at the maintenance state of 
organization began by recording the number of tasks noted by 
participants (RTSTR) throughout the course of the response. Since most 
of these tasks were evidenced at the height of organized activity they 
are referenced at the maintenance state. RTSTR measures responses 
having "1" sinple task structures (less than four) and "2" more complex
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task structures (four or more). Where the actual number was uncertain/ 
responses were coded as simple on this dimension. The frequencies on 
this dimension evidence a larger nunber of complex task structures 
(N=39/ 59.6%) compared to Kreps' larger study where responses were split 
about evenly (52.9% coded as simple).
Next, I recorded any response related contingency expressed by 
participants or relevent others in the disaster context. I did not 
question the exactitude of these expressions but merely recorded 
descriptions of them as they related to domain (DDPR), tasks (TDPR), 
human and material resources (RMPR), and activities (AFPR). Pinpointing 
the timing of these contingencies was difficult, therefore, they too 
were referenced at the maintenance state for purposes of model building. 
DDPR, TDPR, RMPR, and APPR were created such that one or more 
contingency could be coded. For example, case #266 is a response where 
relevant others expressed activities performance problems. Here, 
university students acting as a key resource at initiation, were 
described as creating activity related problems. That is, during the 
height of activity, enough students were drinking beer while on work 
location that city police were expecting problems that never 
materialized.
As in Kreps' study two interaction terms (CR5 and CR6) were 
created. The logic for their creation is based on the analytical 
distinction between "ends" (D T related) and "means" (A R related) 
during the maintenance state of organization (Thompson, 1967; Starbuck,
1983). CR5 combines (multiplicatively) RTSTR (response task structure)
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with domain (DDPR) and tasks (TDPR) contingency variables. CR6 combines 
in like manner RTSER with activities (APPR) and resource (RMPR) 
contingency variables. Each index (CR5 and CR6) simultaneoulsly capture 
the distinction between "means" and "ends" and the complexity of the 
response. Higher scores reflect increasing response complexity.
KfSTRF measures the degree to vtfiich task structures are focused. 
Certainly, all task structures are focused to some degree, regardless if 
they are simple or complex. Some, however, are more explicitly focused 
than others. Therefore, RTS1RF, was used to measure ordinal 
distinctions in reference to physical, social, and temporal dimensions. 
Measurement was as follows: "0" no specific task structure focus
(N=12), "1" focus on one of three dimensions (N=19), "2" focus on two of 
three dimensions (N=18), and "3" focus on all three dimensions (N=3). A 
response task structure which was physically focused was carried out in 
a particular location (e.g., highschool gymnasium). Social dimensions 
include participant attention directed toward particular victim groups 
(e.g., children). Tenporally focused task structures were formulated 
and enacted by participants with certain time limitations collectively 
understood (e.g., before sundown).
A second measure of social network density (NINDEX2) is referenced 
at the maintenance state of organization. Here, the same measurement 
procedure was used as for NINDEXl. PMNT and IMNLINKS were combined 
(additively) to form NINDEX2. Differences evidenced between NINDEXl 
(44% coded as simple) and NINDEX2 (11.5% coded as simple) point to rapid
42
changes that are likely to occur in the "fluidity" of disaster 
situations (Kreps, 1984a).
D. Organization: Suspension
A response may be suspended for a variety of reasons (POSP). For 
instance, the response may persist until the demand is met, be absorbed 
by another entity (e.g., Salvation Army), or lose a critical human or 
material resource. The measurement of these reasons provided some 
insight regarding the survivorship of organization as a key element of 
process. Measurement was, however, weak on this response dimension. 
POSP was collapsed in an effort to isolate responses which "1" 
contintued until the demand was met, or though in process, outcome was 
probable (N=26). All other reasons for suspension were coded "0".
Treated as a dependent variable, TTR measures ordinal distinctions 
in response duration. Measurement was as follows: "1" lasted one to
two days (N=7), "2" lasted two to five days (N=16), "3" lasted six to 
fourteen days (N=19), and "4" over two weeks (N=10). Here, I examine 
how all model variables influence the total time organization lasts.
The following section provides a more detailed discussion of the model 
findings.
MODEL FINDINGS
Step-wise multiple regression techniques were used for examination 
of model relationships at three system states of organization: 
initiation, maintenance, and suspension. Tables 5 through 9 provide 
information obtained from ten separate regressions which relate to these 
system states and will be discussed respectively. At each stage of 
organization, variables are regressed against all others at that stage, 
those at preceding stages, and the two sets of exogeneous variables.
For instance, at Stage 2 (Maintenance of Organization) NINDEX2 is 
regressed against organization conplexity, NINDEX1, organization pattern 
at origins, organization participant characteristics, spatial-temporal 
characteristics, event characteristics, and community unit 
characteristics (see Figure 1). Thus, step-wise procedures are 
sequential in that each regression equation has as candidate predictors 
everything to the left of it on the diagram.
A .10 inclusion criterion is used for adding variables in the 
equation. The lesser criterion is consistent with the exploratory 
nature of the modeling. Also, means, standard deviations, and 
correlations for each model variable are provided in Appendix 1.
The assumptions associated with the principles of least squares 
(QLS) may be relaxed to some degree when employing dichotomous and 
ordinal variables (Kreps, 1983b). However, specific methodological 
qualifications are in order regarding standard regression techniques.
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First, recall that step-wise procedures were used. This means that 
variable entry into any regression was determined by partial correlation 
techniques. As a consequence, important variables may be artificially 
omitted from the equation at a loss of substantial insight. A lesser 
inclusion criterion is responsive to this concern, but creates other 
problems with small samples such as this one. For instance, if the 
number of x variables exceeded or equalled the number of observations 
the normal equation could not be given a unique solution (Hays, 1981). 
Here, the ration of x variables to number of observations is high 
(10:52) though not problematic given my concern with exploratory 
modeling as opposed to hypothesis testing. In addition, the frequent 
use of reciprocal causation yields relatively distinct sets of 
statistically significant independent variables. Che potential effect 
is to bias the coefficients of variables in the equation, thereby 
creating estimation problems (Lewis-Beck, 1980) in regard to population 
parameters. Second, using dichotomous variables (0,1) as dependent 
variables results in biased significance tests because of 
heteroscedastic disturbances (Anderson, 1983). Walsh and Warland (1983) 
echo this point by suggesting that dichotomous dependent variables are 
occasioned by estimation problems. I have, however, replicated 
regressions by use of discriminant techniques and detected no 
significant problems. Third, four equations have ordinal indexes as 
dependent variables. Although multiple regression techniques assume 
normally distributed and interval level dependent variables and 
measurement, I am relying, as others do, on the robustness of these
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techniques when assumptions have been violated. Finally, a comment on 
the model variables left in the equation by using step-wise techniques. 
Simply because a variable is not in the final equation does not 
necessarily mean that it has no influence (Anderson, 1983). For 
example, it may have been omitted because of multicolinearity. Findings 
in Appendix 1 suggest, however, that significant independent variables 
are only moderately correlated.
The following section includes a brief outline and summary of the 
findings presented in Tables 5 through 9. Each finding represents an 
empirically grounded relationship among properties of organization and 
disaster.
Findings. SfcafcgaeofcSi Origins (Table, 5,and,Table. 6
1. The more complex the social network at origins (NINDEX1), the 
later in the emergency period is organization enacted (TINT).
2. Where participants in the enacting unit express high degrees 
of concern for victim losses (PERS), the later in the emergency 
period is organization enacted (TINT).
3. Where participants in the enacting unit adopt a task structure 
developed by others (TDEV), the later in the emergency period 
is organization enacted (TINT).
4. Where social links to dominant activity areas are great (SIDA), 
the more likely is organization enacted in close proximity to the 
primary impact area (PLPI).
5. The larger the enacting unit (SIZ), the more conplex its social 
network at the origins of organization (NINDEX1).
6. When enacted by an emergent group of individuals as opposed to 
an emergent group of other groups and organizations (FOT), the 
more complex is the social network at the origins of organization 
(NINDEXl).
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7. Where the impacted community is metropolitan as opposed to 
non-metropolitan (COMM), the less complex is the social network 
at the origins of organization (NINDEX1).
8. Where social links to dominant activity area are few (SLDA), 
the more complex is the social network at the origins of organi­
zation (NINDEXl).
9. Where there is greater event forewarning (EVEKTCTP), the greater 
the evidence of formal rationality at the origins of organiza­
tion (QRG-PAT).
10. The greater the disaster experience in the impacted community 
(C-EXP) , the greater the evidence of collective behavior at the 
origins of organization (QRG-PAT).
The four regressions at the initiation state of organization have 
as dependent variables time of initiation (TINT), proximity to primary 
impact area (PLPI), social network complexity (NINDEXl), and 
organization pattern (QRG-PAT) and will be discussed respectively.
First, findings indicate that the spatial and torporal location of 
orgnization at initiation is related to NINDEXl, PERS, TDEV, and SLDA. 
Given these predictors, the overall tendency for emergent organization 
is later initiation time relative to the occurence of event and 
proximity to the primary impact area.
The relation of PERS and TINT (Statement 2) is interpreted as an 
indication of participants' awareness of victims' needs and experiences 
relative to the event. Though in another context, Ranter (1977) 
provides an account for the significance of PERS for emergent 
organization at origins. Ranter argues that early stages of 
organization are characterized by high degrees of uncertainty and 
pressures for similarity of participants. Invariably, during the 
origins of organization, key participants make choices about the
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TABLE 5: Origins of Organization, Stage 1
Significant
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables: Time of Initiation 
(TINT), Physical 
Location to Primary 
Impact (PLPI)
TINT H£I
BETA F BETA
Event Related
Organization-Related
Social Network .368 8.614***
at Origins 
(NINDEXl)
Personal .339 7.203***
Orientation 
(PERS)
Task -.249 3.921*
Development 
(TDEV)
Social Links .241 3.100*
to Dominant 
Activity Area 
(SICA)
Constant 2.37 .150
£2 .25 .058
*p is less than .10
**p is less than .05
***p is less than .01
****p is less than .001
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TABLE 6: Origins of Organization, Stage 1
Significant
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables: Social Network
(NINDEXl), Origins 
Pattern (OPG-PAT)
M M DGKl
BETA
Eygnt^  .Related
Event Type 
(EVENTTP)
Unit Siz (SIZ) .248
Time of .328
Initiation 
(TINT)
Social Links -.350
to Dominant 
Activity Area 
(SIDA)
Unit Type (FCT) -.206
CQirmunitvUnit, Belated
Size (CCMM)
Disaster
Experience
(C-EXP)
£2
-.292
1.557
.40
*p is less than .10
**p is less than .05
***p is less than .01
****p is less than .001
4.199**
8.302***
9.397***
2.862*
6.344*
QRG-PAT
BETA
.234 3.142*
-.296 5.013**
3.262
.16
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inclusion of others. Such choices reflect a selection process during 
which homogeneous rather than diversified persons/groups become unit 
members. For new (emergent) organization, homogeneity is evidenced in 
participants' conmunication wherein participants' personal background 
and concern unfold. On the other hand, participants of more established 
units make selections about the inclusion of others based on homogeneity 
of organization related experiences. For each unit type "similarity of 
outlook guarantees at least sane basis of trust and mutual 
understanding" (Ranter, 1977, p.49). Expressions of concern for 
victims' personal losses may therefore, provide this key discretionary 
feature at the origins of emergent organization. As the response 
unfolds, I suspect participants translate the above kind of awareness 
into a pattern of organization at initiation on the collective behavior 
end of the continuum. The zero order correlations for PERS and ORG-PAT 
(r=-.23) moderately support this hypothesis.
Francis and Kreps (1984) argue that emergent organization depends 
on social unit comparability of emergent units and the broader social 
network of the focal unit. Where comparability, in terms of type of 
unit, domain, and activities is evident so is the systemic 
(interdependent) character of ecological organization. Emergent units 
are, however, more dissimilar vis-a-vis origins for reasons noted above 
and because of their unique spatial and temporal features. In addition, 
the disaster event disrupts characteristics of ecological organization.
What happens then, as new (emergent) units overcome these
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differences and evolve toward organization as Kreps defines it? First, 
it is important to note that Kreps' referent is the individual social 
unit. On the other hand, population ecologists who are also concerned 
with new organization study populations of social units which reflect 
"species" similarity and survivorship in the disaster context (Kreps' 
referent). Since emergent units evolve and operate in a dissimilar 
environment, niche maintenance is critical for population membership.
But the niche or sphere of social action of emergent units is likely to 
became less secure given their dissimilarity, thereby increasing the 
need for boundary maintenance.
McKelvey (1982) defines a niche as "that set of external forces 
that impose constraints on an individual organization or population of 
organizations that are subject to its influence" (McKelvey, 1982, 
p. 458). Niches are the immediate portion of a response environment 
which can be utilized and changed by emergent units. In addition, a 
niche is related to the spatial and temporal location of the emergent 
unit, associated activities, and the allocation of scarce resources by 
other units necessary for the enactment of organization. Each of these 
define the systemic space (niche width) for emergent units as members of 
a population of social units. In effect, McKelvey (1982) argues that 
"autogenic" and "allogenic" forces interact relative to organization and 
are central to the development of a niche. But not all researchers of 
organization hold to this opinion. For instance, some writers (Hannon 
and Freeman, 1977; and other population ecologists) contend that the 
environment is a causal factor in relation to organization (allogenic
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factors as predictors). Indeed, they argue (in different terras) that 
environment related features "select out" types of social units that 
evolve toward organization as defined by Kreps. Others argue just the 
opposite: that organizations shape their environment (autogenic
factors), not vice versa.
Francis and Kreps (1984) found that both autogenic (closed system 
strain at the maintenance of organization of existing units) and 
allogenic forces (dissimilar routine activity types) constrain new 
organization. Similarly, findings on 52 emergent units show the 
significance of autogenic and allogenic forces to the initiation of 
organization. Statements 7,9, and 10 point to autogenic forces at work. 
Remaining statements highlight allogenic forces which characterize the 
model of emergent organization. In sum, by using Kreps' referent to 
individual social units, we are better able to interpret what he calls 
the hierarchical character of the ecological context as it relates to 
emergent organization in the disaster setting. By hierarchical Kreps, 
drawing from the tradition of human ecology (Hawley, 1950), means that 
populations are comprised of successive aggregations of units ordered to 
facilitate economy in the acquisition and distribution of scarce 
resources and other activities. Hie hierarchical character points to 
the systemic (interdependent) aspect of ecological context. When 
disrupted by disaster, the niche width expands making available systemic 
space for new (emergent) organization. Emergent units may, therefore, 
enhance efficiencies critical for community survival by supplanting 
hierarchical arrangements unable to meet disaster demands.
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Findings in the larger study (N=423) point to four predictor 
variables in relation to ORG-PAT. However, in this analysis only one 
event and one community unit related variable predict ORG-PAT.
Statements 9 and 10 summarize the significant variable relationships in 
the equation for ORG-PAT. This would suggest that organization patterns 
are difficult to predict with data on allogenic characteristics. Yet, 
the seemingly "spatial and temporal randomness of disaster impacts" 
(Kreps, 1984b) and the evidenced "milling" (Turner and Killian, 1972) 
which takes place in the emergency period (Statements 1, 2, and 6) point 
to the dynamics of emergent units. Still, some argue that organization 
patterns at origins are at most random occurances for emergent units. A 
representative statement may be drawn from Weller (1969) who suggests 
that "things just happen". Rather than accept this view on the 
randomness of origins, I believe that we simply need to collect better 
data on what is happening. Available data on emergent units is simply 
not rich enough to support Weller's (and others) contention.
Findings Statements; Maintenance (Table 7 and Table 8)
1. Domain-task complexity (CR5) and activities-resource complexity 
(CR6) are mutually related at the maintenance state of organi­
zation.
2. Collective behavior at the origins of organization (ORG-PAT) is 
related to domain-task complexity at the maintenance state of 
organization (CR5).
3. Where usable human attributes are less critical for the enact­
ment of organization (KEYRES), there is greater evidence of 
complexity in terms of activities-resources (CR6).
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4. Where military resources are relevant to the enactment of organ­
ization (LOCMIL), there is greater evidence of complexity in 
terms of activities-resources (CR6).
5. The later in the emergency period that organization is enacted 
(TINT), the greater evidence of focused task structures 
(FTSTRF).
6. Where usable human attributes are less critical for the enact­
ment of organization (KEYRES), there is greater evidence of 
focused task structures (FTSTRF).
7. Where participants in the enacting unit express a high degree 
of concern for community damage and participant control of the 
response (COMC), the more complex the social network at main­
tenance (NINDEX2).
8. The greater the complexity of resources— activities 
restructuring (CR6), the more complex the social network at 
maintenance (NINDEX2).
9. Hie more complex the social network at origins (NINDEXl), the 
more complex the social network at maintenance (NINDEX2).
Hie findings at the maintenance state of organization point to 
similarities between emergent units and the total sample of responses in 
the larger study. Hie main one is included in Statement 1. Findings 
also highlight key continuities and discontinuities of the four elements 
of organization, evidencing the duality of action and order.
It is important to remember that CR5 and CR6 are related measures 
of response complexity in terms of "ends" (D T related) and "means" (A R 
related). In addition, they are interpreted as two distinct indicators 
of response restructuring. As in the larger study, my data point to the 
continuity of the four elements of organization (Statement 1) and 
highlight their independence as noted in the moderate zero order 
correlation (r=.33). Hie observation that they are less than perfectly 
correlated suggests that each index contributes unique information and
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TABLE 7: Maintenance of Organization, Stage 2
Significant
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables: Complexity of
Response (CR5), 
Complexity of 
Response (CR6)
CR5 (ends) 
BETA
Event Related
Organization Related
Response
Complexity
(CR5)
Response .281
Complexity 
(CR6)
Organization -.254
Pattern 
(ORG-PAT)
Key Resource 
at Initiation 
(KEYRES)
Community Unit Related
Involvement 
of Military 
(LOCMIL)
Constant
£2
3.861
.17
*p is less than .10
**p is less than .05
***p is less than .01
****p is less than .001
£R6-lmeaJ^ I
BETA
.298 6.349**
4.518**
3.703*
-.309 6.904**
.390 10.838***
2.275
.33
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TABLE 8: Maintenance of Organization, Stage 2
Significant
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables:
RTSTRF
BETA
Event Related
Organization Related
Time of .251
Initiation 
(TINT)
Community
Orientation
(COMC)
Key Resource -.281
at Initiation 
(KEYRES)
Response
Complexity
(CR6)
Social Network 
at Origins 
(NINDEXl)
Constant 1.213
£2. .18
Response Task 
Structure Focus 
(RTSTRF), Social 
Network at 
Maintenance 
(NINDEX2)
NJM3JX2,
BETA £
3.462*
.209 3.248*
4.347**
.268 5.525**
.429 13.498****
1.376
.39
*p is less than .10
**p is less than .05
***p is less than .01
****p is less than .001
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reflects measurement error probability.
Referenced at the maintenance state, Kreps (1983b) calls 
domain-tasks dominated responses the predecessor of administrative 
rationality and activity-resource dominated responses the predecessor of 
forms of substantive rationality. Domain-tasks dominated responses 
highlight the continuity of action and order by means of routine 
restructuring of the four elements of organization. Starbuck (1983) 
emphasizes this same point, though in different terms, in his discussion 
of organization domains. He argues that domains shape or orient key 
participants' perceptions of ongoing activity. In general, domains 
provide a frame of reference for participants. While domains facilitate 
the understanding of action, participants' understanding tends to be 
biased in the short run and out-dated in the long run. By implication, 
collective representations (domain, tasks) become increasingly insulated 
from ongoing activity as the response unfolds. That is, as formal 
rationality at origins translates into administrative rationality at 
maintenance, organization action may become unreflective and nonadaptive 
as Starbuck implies. Hie pattern continues until a crisis state 
develops.
Kreps (1983b) found that the translation process (from D T 
initiated responses to administrative rationality) evidenced in more 
established groups was most apparent in patterns of response 
restructuring. Though not significant at the .10 inclusion level, 
restructuring in terms of means (CR6) was lower (r=-.18) and
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restructuring in terms of ends (CR5) lower (r=-.30) where administrative
rationality dominated. However, one of two case descriptions of pattern
restructuring at maintenance provides qualitative support in relation to
routine restructuring. Note the following empirical example of a T R A
D pattern of organization at initiation. Here, domain and tasks become
increasingly insulated as the response unfolds. But also, we evidence
activity-resource restructuring:
The domain of a group of local laundry associations is the 
organization of providing victim basic needs. Hie response is 
initiated about 30 hours following a severe hurricane (long 
forewarning). Virtually thousands of victims are without 
clothing, shelter, and electricity. One laundry association 
that we knew of recognizes the extensive loss of clothing, 
apparent by plane loads of clothing arriving shortly after 
impact. Contacts to other laundry establishments are made,
and a simple task structure is set up; one involving pick-up
and delivery of clothes from the airport to each laundry 
establishment, and subsequent cleaning and sorting into sizes 
(T). For purposes of safety and efficiency the clothing is 
cleaned and sorted prior to distribution. Each laundry 
establishment pools resources and recruits vehicles and 
volunteer drivers (R). Task related activities begin shortly 
after resource mobilization (A). Once initiated and 
activities are underway, Red Cross participation provides 
external legitimation by joining the response (D). Key 
participants do not anticipate the amount of resources and 
type of coordinated activities necessary to complete disaster 
demand. This is evident by the participants' mere suggestion 
that the Red Cross transport the clothing to area shelters as 
opposed to actively planning for the logical transition in 
domain related activities and resources. Domain and tasks 
become increasingly insulated from inadequate means at the 
height of activity. The Red Cross, in response to the pending 
contingency, contacts the Volunteers of America (V.O.A.) 
because clothes cannot be transported without new resources 
and activities. Hie V.O.A., in turn, brings to the response a 
new set of resources (R); trucks and drivers as the primary 
ones. Once mobilized the V.O.A. formulates new domain 
related activities (A) and proceeds to disperse clothes to 
shelter areas. Hie response ends when area shelters have an 
adequate supply of clothing.
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Hie insulation of domain and tasks and restructuring of activities is 
what Kreps (1983b) calls a "closed system strain toward administrative 
rationality".
Preceded by response complexity in terms of means (CR6) and 
participant concern for community damage and control of the response 
(CQMC), and a more complex social network at origins of organization 
(NINDEXl) r the social network at maintenance becomes increasingly 
complex (Statements 7, 8, and 9). In addition, zero order correlations 
show positive relationships between NINDEXl, NINDEX2, and response 
complexity/contingency indicators (NINDEXl and CR5, r=.20; NINDEXl and 
GR6, r=.16? NINDEXl and NINDEX2, r=.52; NINDEX2 and CR5, r=.28;
NINDEX2 and CR6, r=.36). Given these predictors of network complexity 
it seems as though emergent units show network based contingencies at 
origins and as the response unfolds. Seme of these problems have a 
negative effect on the viability of emergent organization as the 
following findings suggest.
Findings Statements : Suspension (Table 9)
1. When enacted by emergent groups of individuals as opposed 
to emergent groups of other groups and organizations (EOT), 
the more likely is organization to persist until the demand 
is met (POSP).
2. Hie longer the duration of organization (HER), the less 
likely will organization persist until the demand is met 
(POSP).
3. Hie more complex the response in terms of means (CR6), the 
less likely will organization persist until the demand is met 
(POSP).
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4. The greater the size of the enacting unit (SIZ), the longer 
the duration of organization (TTR).
5. The greater the importance of usable human attributes at the 
origins of organization (KEYRES), the longer the duration of 
organization (TTR).
6. lhe more complex the social network at origins (NINDEXl), 
the shorter the duration of organization (TTR).
7. Hie more complex the social network at the maintenance of
organization (NINDEX2), the longer the duration of organiza­
tion (TTR).
8. Where participants in the enacting unit develop their own
task structure (TDEV), the shorter the duration of organiza­
tion (TTR) •
9. Hie later in the emergency period that organization is 
enacted (TINT) , the longer the duration of organization (TTR).
Hie most important finding in relation to suspension of 
organization is that pattern of organization at origins (QRG-PAT) has no 
significant relationship to reason for suspension or duration of 
organization. On the other hand, data from the larger study (N=423) 
show a strong link between formal rationality at origins and persistence 
of organization. Hiis latter finding as well as related ones (Gamson, 
1975; Goldstone, 1980) support the hypothesis that more formally 
patterned instances are likely to last longer and generally persist 
until demand is met. My data, however, simply do not support this 
point.
Even though organization pattern at origins is not a predictor of 
the persistence of organization, other findings point to the dynamics of 
viable emergent units. These are highlighted in Statements 1 through 3. 
The chances for persistence are greater for shorter responses because
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TABLE 9: Suspension of Organization, Stage 3
Significant
Independent
Variables
Dependent Variables: Pattern of
Suspension (POSP), 
Total Time of 
Response (TER)
£Q£P
BETA £
Organization Related
Unit Type (FOT) -.296 6.496**
Unit Siz (SIZ)
Key Resource 
at Initiation 
(KEYRES)
Social Network 
at Origins 
(NINDEXl)
Social Network 
at Maintenance 
(NINDEX2)
Task Development 
(TDEV)
Response -.249 4.534**
Complexity (CR6)
Time of 
Initiation (TINT)
Total Time of 
Response (TER)
Constant
£2
1.378
.35
TIE
BETA
.457
.367
-.326
.364
-.263
.688
-.439 14.005****
.006
.68
23.389****
15.384****
8.915***
13.479****
9.168***
50.232****
*p is less than .10
**p is less than .05
***p is less than .01
****p is less than .001
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longer responses are likely to be absorbed by another entity once it 
(absorbing entity) has had time to recoup relative to event.
More than any other equation, the regression for the duration of 
organization (TER) points to the internal dynamics of emergent 
organization. Table 9 lists six organization unit variables which 
relate to or facilitate response duration. Tie number of significant 
independent variables could be one general consequence of researchers* 
increased time and opportunity to gather related data on longer emergent 
responses. Marx (1982) argues, however, that findings on organization 
related variables are more prevalent because they are more tangible 
(e.g., leaders, written statements, activities) than community or 
environment related variables which, he believes, are simply more 
difficult to decipher because of their indirect influence.
Tie observation that no community unit or event related variables 
significantly relate to TTR does not mean, however, that emergent units 
are autonomous entities whose persistence is determined by participants 
alone. Indeed, the regressions at origins and maintenance of 
organization point to both autogenic and allogenic forces at work. 
Furthermore, Francis and Kreps' (1984) study of 465 dyadic social 
network relationships compliments our understanding of how the 
ecological context of social units facilitates, prevents, or influences 
the duration of organization. I suspect, though, that examples of 
organization and environment or community related variables which 
influence emergent organization are less apparent and less frequently
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observed by researchers whose sole referent is organization sets or 
populations, whose perspective on organization is static as opposed to 
processual, and whose studies are in non-disaster settings.
Statement 4 points to the importance of accounting for property 
variances at maintenance which may lead to pattern suspension or 
reconstruction. Here, larger enacting units are related to the longer 
duration of organization. But a decrease in SIZ to an undetermined 
threshold level could set off a resource related response suspension, 
thereby decreasing TER. Statements 6 and 7 nicely illustrate Aveni's 
(1978) contention that organization linkages are "of great consequence 
to organizations". According to Aveni, a linkage is any "recurrent 
pattern of behavior which exists between two systems and is supported by 
both" (Aveni, 1978, p.185). Thus, as Marx (1982) suggests, it is not 
only the complexity of the social network at origins and maintenance 
that influences organization duration and effectiveness but the content 
and style of coirmunication patterns within the social network. While 
social units have direct links to a range of relevant persons and 
organizations, the content and style of coirmunication between units may 
have various consequences for the focal unit (e.g., positive or 
negative). An example of a negative consequence resulting from 
participation in a dyadic relationship may occur when the relevant other 
uses tactics to create a negative image of the focal emergent unit 
(e.g., disaster related bureaucracies which advise victims to reject 
emergent units' offers of assistance) thereby decreasing external domain 
legitimation.
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The main finding is summarized in Statement 9: The later in the
emergency period that organization is enacted (TINT) , the longer the 
duration of organization (TTR). Smelser (1962) argues, in relation to 
this finding, that emergent units have first, "vague inclusive goals" 
and second, a rapid "growth rate" relative to an event which creates a 
comparably rapid rate of decline (Wood, 1982) • Yet, the emergent units
in this analysis have clearly defined domains at initiation.
Furthermore, as marginals for TINT suggest emergent units develop at 
various times relative to the event. The regression of TER and 
marginals for TINT suggest to me that not all emergent units fit 
Smelser1 s model in terms of process initiation and duration. More 
important, the significance of the timing of enactment on TTR stresses 
the need for more variables on this dimension of organization.
The following section provides a more comprehensive summary of 
model findings. Here I discuss key points of emphasis mentioned
throughout the analysis of 52 emergent units, related attributes of
emergent units, and directions for subsequent analyses on organization 
and emergent units.
DISCUSSION
Hie data obtained from the DRC interviews have provided useful and 
interesting information about emergent units and the process of 
organization. Hie model of organization considers directly the origins, 
maintenance, and suspension of emergent organization.
I have restricted the analysis to direct relationships captured by 
multiple regression techniques. I consider this approach appropriate 
for two reasons. First, in consideration of the methodological 
qualifications associated with step-wise procedures, I would not feel 
comfortable making anything other than conservative statements on model 
findings. Second, and more important, the model is devised only as a 
tool for data organization and filtering. Hie findings provided, 
therefore, are intended to facilitate hypothesis generation. In effect, 
ny objective has not been to test hypotheses, rather to "conmunicate the 
general thrust of the theory while avoiding statistical artifact in 
modeling" emergent organization (Kreps, 1983b).
Building on Kreps (1983a; 1983b; 1984a; 1984b; 1984c) theory
and taxonomy of organization, I am not trying to "explain" a certain 
type of social unit, but rather to consider directly the uniqueness of 
emergent units.
Much has been indicated in iry own and Kreps1 analyses about the 
forms of organization. We have emphasized both structure and process.
I have, however, also included social and psychological variables in the 
model. Some of these variables were significantly related to
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initiation, maintenance, and suspension of organization. I am not sure, 
however, about the degree to which social psychological variables, in 
general, either enhance or confuse the description and understanding of 
Kreps' definition of organization. Regardless, some are influential 
factors in the process of organization. From a sociological 
perspective, I would argue that a structural definition of organization 
is appropriate. But, in view of the findings and my work with the case 
interviews, I believe that any attempts to explain the origins and 
process of organization without at minimum, addressing social 
psychological variables is unrealistic and misleading (Walsh and 
Warland, 1983). Though, like others, I have speculated the desirable 
"theoretical mix of form and content" (Kreps, 1983a) which would best 
engulf the "guts of the phenomena called organization". Mine is at best 
a reflection, a beginner's guess.
Model findings clearly point to the critical role of the spatial 
and temporal dimensions of organization. Central to the notion of 
process, these variables encourage a new direction regarding data 
collection and theory construction. As Giddens (1979) states, spatial 
and temporal elements are integral to social theory. However, the 
comnunication or demonstration of their theoretical relevance is 
contingent upon empirical findings described in a way which is 
informative. This is why I have provided the reader with case 
descriptions from ny analysis.
In addition to the model findings, marginals from the data suggest 
some positive attributes in relation to emergent units. Certainly,
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marginals do not "tell" us what emergent units are like. Rather, they 
have left this researcher with a few revised connotations in relation to 
emergent units. I would like to share some of these perceptions.
First, many responses (N=32) were engaged in time urgent disaster 
demands. That is, they were performing functions which had to be 
confronted immediately. Second, twenty-six of the responses persisted 
until the demand was met. Of those which did not, eleven were absorbed 
by another entity (e.g., Red Cross). Finally, all of the responses in 
this analysis are "organized". By definition, all received some form of 
domain legitimation. That is, relevant others were doing one of several 
things; referring victims, providing response resources, giving verbal 
approval, or recognizing responses as responsible for a given disaster 
demand and making the recognition public, in this sense, "emergent" 
units are not unlike "established" forms of organization. In addition, 
findings at the maintenance state of organization point to other key 
similarities. In sum, findings suggest, to me, that emergent units, 
ephemeral responses, are not necessarily "unstructured" (Lang and Lang, 
1961), "problematic" (Parr, 1969), or "relatively unorganized" (Perry 
and Pugh, 1978).
But can we classify emergent units in a more definitive fashion? 
Gamson (1975) and Goldstone (1980) evaluate emergent units in terms of 
their consequences which are called either "success" or "failure".
Their comments highlight the multidimensional quality of "success" and 
"failure", and unfortunately, compel one to question the efficacy of the 
concepts in relation to organization. For example, Gamson says that one
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qualification for "more successful" challenges of protest groups is 
their ability to gain acceptance from relevant others. However, what he 
deems as indicative of a degree of success, Kreps would classify as part 
of organization development (e.g., domain external legitimation). 
Starbuck (1983), on the other hand, implies in different terms that 
forms of collective behavior "fail" in the long run. Failure is not, 
however, related to rejection on the part of relevant others. Rather, 
where collective representations are questionable, the viability of the 
enacting unit is at stake. My data do not support Starbuck*s suggestion 
for two reasons. First, the regression of pattern of suspension (FQSP) 
shews no significant relationship to pattern of organization at origins 
(ORG-PAT). Second, the distributions of organization patterns listed on 
Table 1 and the metric of organization forms listed on Table 4 reveal 
that emergent units encompass the entire range of forms of organization. 
Still, more needs to be said about the origins of organization in 
general for they are theoretically informative and critical for our 
understanding of the process of organization.
I suspect that the failure to consider directly the origins of 
organization and other things social has played a part in keeping 
sociology from an important, still neglected objective. The objective 
concerns the need to merge collective behavior and organization 
perspectives. The result of such a merger would provide gains for the 
discipline as a whole, not so much for each perspective as a specialty. 
Judging from ny exposure to both, they seem to be generating ideas about 
and working with phenomena which are part and parcel to the same
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underlying process of organization (Kreps, 1983a). Each specialty and 
related ideas have, in varying degree pointed to an awareness of 
emergent structural and processual features of organization. Hie 
ability to grasp the observed elements and different patterns of 
organization as defined by Kreps is not, however, beyond the reach of 
either specialty provided some theoretical and research collaboration is 
initiated and maintained.
Clearly, some (Weller, 1973; and others) have anticipated the 
sociological gains resulting from a theoretical merger. Still, the 
failure to integrate persists. Drawing from and elaborating upon Kreps' 
(1984a) insights, the following are a few reasons why the segregation 
between collective behavior and organization perspectives may have 
persisted thus far.
The study of disasters has been consistently defined as an 
interdisciplinary specialty. It has, however, only recently been 
adopted as a central topic in collective behavior (Perry and Pugh,
1978). Second, and related, the study of disaster has failed to emerge 
from what Gamson (1975) calls the "straitjacket" of collective behavior. 
By this Gamson is referring to the theoretical restrictions of 
collective behavior studies. Ihough some would disagree, I believe that 
collective behavior theories have traditionally considered the origins 
and consequences of emergent social action. Ihey have, though, ignored 
the social properties of emergent collectivities (Kreps, 1984a). In 
addition, collective behavior phenomena are frequently analyzed by means 
of ad hoc theorizing (Weller and Quarantelli, 1973).
69
The third reason for perspective segregation involves the content 
of much past and contemporary organization studies. In the haste to 
analyze the content of organization, too many researchers have assumed 
the existence of organization. And, in doing so, researchers avoid the 
"numerous difficulties associated with the study of the emergent 
organization and organization set" (Foss, 1980, p.36). This procedure 
for research has led to inadequate attempts to provide a clear 
definition of emergent units. For when one assumes organization rather 
than viewing it as problematic, the result is a parochial understanding 
of process (Kreps, 1983a). It gives short shrift to one of two critical 
features of organization; the element of process.
While the gap between the two perspectives is theoretical in 
nature, I suspect that this is highly related to their often segregated 
research situations. Collective behaviorists have traditionally studied 
crowd behavior, civil disturbances, and more recently disaster events. 
Organization researchers have usually studied variations of more 
institutionalized behavior.
Researchers from each specialty area who have studied disaster 
events are, however, presented with a unique opportunity to observe both 
collective behavior and more formally rational instances of 
organization. Many people somehow "expect" more established units to be 
engaged in disaster related activities. Because natural disasters often 
(1) create time limits on emergent organization (e.g., total time 
available before emergent unit disaster demand is met) and (2) sometimes 
alter the conditions of the impacted area emergent units develop to fill
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new demands (Parr, 1970). nrThe occurrence of a disaster can, therefore, 
be used as an indicator or notification of the possible formation" of 
emergent units (Ross, 1980, p.35) • For researchers from each specialty, 
no such "convenient notification" exists in more routine settings.
My point is not to simply advocate disaster studies though I stress 
their sociological relevance. Rather, ny objective is and has been to 
present an argument for (1) the critical role of origins on regard to 
organization, (2) the relationship between emergent and more established 
processes of organization, and (3) the rejection of the superficial 
distinction between collective behavior and organization perspectives.
I believe that a continuation of the theoretical and research 
segregation is not only unnecessary but detrimental for the overall 
advancement of a sociological theory of "organization".
Integration is possible. But, as Kreps says, at least two 
requirements must be met for this to happen. First, sociologists must 
shed the notion that disaster and emergency studies are an encapsuled 
realm of inquiry. To the contrary, they serve as fertile grounds for 
gaining insights concerning organization, other things social, and human 
vulnerability. Equally important, organization and collective behavior 
specialists need to develop a sociological and processual perspective of 
these phenomena. Since I believe that actions speak louder than words, 
it is my hope that the preceding account of my research process 
contributes to meeting these requirements.
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APPENDIX Is Means, Standard Deviations,
and Correlations of Model Variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. EVENTTP 1.00 .10 -.38 -.18 .28 -.20 .04
2. ACHQ 1.00 -.08 -.16 -.01 -.16 .15
3. COMM 1.00 .10 -.12 -.04 .13
4. C-EXP 1.00 .00 .28 .09
5. LOCMIL 1.00 -.08 .03
6. TINT 1.00 .16
7. H jPI 1.00
8. SIZ
9. KEYRES
10. FOT
11. DESTAB
12. TDEV
13. SLDA
14. EMP
15. PERS
16. COMC
17. NINDEX1
18. ORG-PAT
19. CR5
20. CR6
21. KESTRF
22. N INDEX 2
23. TER
24. POSP
Mean 2.21 .62 .50 2.31 .44 3.10 .29
Std. Dev. .87 .49 .50 1.18 .50 1.49 .46
8
.25
-.07
-.02
.13
.19
-.03
.07
1.00
2.79
1.19
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APPENDIX Is Means, Standard Deviations, and
Correlations of Model Variables, Continued
1. EVENTTP 9-.10
10
-.09
11
.16
12
.35
13
.24
14
.26
15
-.02
16
-.29
2. ACEN .05 .14 -.10 .21 -.06 .04 .01 .00
3. COMM -.04 -.15 -.17 -.21 -.08 -.16 .12 -.08
4. C-EXP -.19 .05 -.11 -.12 -.10 .13 .29 .13
5. LOCMIL .07 -.03 -.33 .06 -.25 .14 .06 .04
6. TINT -.30 .01 -.04 -.19 .02 -.13 .27 .20
7. FLPI -.19 -.18 -.13 -.08 .24 .12 -.01 -.21
8. SIZ -.28 -.33 .09 .10 .06 .08 .08 .08
9. KEXRES 1.00 .27 .06 .09 -.19 -.03 -.24 .19
10. EOT 1.00 -.12 -.07 -.02 .07 -.02 .15
11. DESTAB 1.00 .18 -.01 .02 -.05 .00
12. TOEV 1.00 -.12 .07 .13 .00
13. SLDA 1.00 .04 .09 -.40
14. EMP 1.00 -.09 -.31
15. PEES 1.00 -.12
16. OOMC 1.00
17. NINDEX1
18. ORG-PAT
19. CR5
20. CR6
21. RTSTRF
22. NINDEX2
23. TTR
24. POSP
Std.
Mean
Dev.
.48
.50
.54
.50
.69
.47
.85
.36
.62
.49
.58
.50
.40
.50
.50
.50
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APPENDIX Is Means, Standard Deviations, and
Correlations of Model Variables, Continued
1. EVENTTP
17
.02
18
.29
19
.00
20
.18
21
-.15
22
-.03
23
-.25
24
.01
2. ACTN -.02 -.01 -.08 -.11 -.25 -.17 -.20 -.01
3. COMM -.25 -.14 .18 -.05 -.15 -.10 .12 .12
4. C-EXP .11 -.34 -.02 .11 .27 .09 .33 -.33
5. LOCMIL .23 .06 .12 .40 -.23 .28 .03 -.17
6. TINT .32 .03 -.07 .00 .34 .16 .57 -.30
7. FLPI .08 .10 -.08 -.08 -.06 -.11 .12 -.05
8. SIZ .29 -.07 .18 .28 .12 .12 .25 -.04
9. KEYRES -.08 .09 .06 -.26 -.36 -.02 .03 .00
10. POT -.23 -.05 -.07 -.05 -.05 -.10 -.05 -.26
11. DESTAB -.04 .15 -.05 -.14 .15 .08 -.01 .01
12. TDEV .04 .01 -.05 .11 .05 -.05 -.34 .17
13. SLDA -.30 .05 -.08 -.07 .01 -.22 .01 -.01
14. EMP .10 -.14 .02 .14 .11 -.06 -.14 -.10
15. FERS -.11 -.23 -.03 .24 .14 -.07 .21 -.26
16. GOMC .25 -.09 .03 .12 -.02 .35 .24 -.27
17. NINDEX1 1.00 -.04 .20 .16 .19 .52 .18 -.23
18. ORG-PAT 1.00 -.31 -.19 -.02 -.10 -.10 .16
19. CR5 1.00 .33 -.03 .28 .18 -.24
20. CR6 1.00 .11 .36 .13 -.29
21. RTSTRF 1.00 .09 .20 -.13
22. NINDEX2 1.00 .36 -.32
23. TTR 1.00 -.46
24. FQSP 1.00
Std.
Mean
Dev.
1.83
.86
3.29
1.55
3.50
2.36
3.54
2.57
1.52
1.20
2.54
.78
2.62
.95
.44
.50
APPENDIX 2: Case Descriptions
Response #118: A R T D Public Information
'Hie domain of the response is dispersal of public information. Hie 
business district of a metropolis receives heavy damages following an 
earthquake. A neighboring suburb suffers from extensive damages. IVo 
days post-impact, a civilian walks into the search and rescue office 
located in a downtown administration building, and offers his 
assistance. He doens't request a particular activity, just the 
opportunity to help. At the time of his offer, the rescue group is 
about to start compiling a list of homes located in the impacted suburb 
area. From this area, about 100 persons are assumed dead or missing and 
need to be accounted for. Hie civilian, with the aid of three city 
secretaries begins response activities by making calls to local persons 
(A). Hie small group subsequently acquires a key resource; a hotline 
originally set up for Civil Defense use (R). Once activities are 
initiated and resources mobilized the unit develops a simple task 
structure whereby they receive calls on the hotline and use the radio to 
broadcast names of missing persons (T). Requests are made to local 
residents to call in and report seeing persons thought missing or dead. 
Verified names are systematically crossed off the list using this 
procedure. Hie operation is recognized and identified as a clearing 
house for missing persons (D). Hiree days after the first radio 
broadcast the emergency period and urgency of the response subsides.
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Every name on the original list is cleared and the responsibility for 
other missing person cases is handed over to the Salvation Army.
Response participants disband. Hie first civilian goes heme and the 
secretaries return to their regular office duties in another city 
building.
Response #266: R D A T Mobilization of Personnel
Hie domain of the response involves mobilization of emergency 
personnel. TVo months prior to extensive flooding from snow runoff 
(long forewarning) the student body president (s.b.p.) of a local 
university anticipates the need for student assistance. Aware of 
community unit experience with flooding and associated event demands 
(e.g., sand-bagging) the s.b.p. contacts the City Council and offers 
student services for such demands. Acting as the on-campus coordinator, 
the s.b.p. contacts various student organizations (e.g., Greek, 
resident hall assistants), and thereby mobilizes hundreds of students 
for the upcoming demands (R). IWo days before flooding begins, a city 
comnisioner contacts the s.b.p. and requests the services of students 
(D). Immediately students go to locations and begin response activities 
(A). Response problems develop early when requests get doubled up. For 
instance, calls are made for 300 students when only 50 are needed. In 
general, students are fed up with the current pattern of operation. In 
response, the s.b.p. seeks assistance from the university president. 
Together they develop a task structure which includes the acquisition of 
city maps, establishment of a manpower office in the student government 
office, and a downtown office staffed by students (T). In addition, the
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president cancels scheduled school classes for two days. This decision 
is critical for the continuation of student participation. One day 
before the flood water crests and begins to recede, students are forced 
to terminate response activities. Hie president refuses to extend the 
time of class cancelation and sets of response suspension.
Response #293; T R D A Public Information
The domain of the response, enacted by local media groups, is 
public information. Hours following a flood, an executive town meeting 
is held to discuss pending issues. Persons present include the mayor, 
city officials, the director of a local radio station, and 
representatives from various city organizations. One issue of debate 
centers on local media coverage of the flood and related instructions to 
the public. In general, the media is charged with releasing incorrect 
information to the public. In response to the criticisms, the director 
of a local radio station suggests the implementation of a task structure 
for local media. For instance, he recommends developing a local media 
pool, and setting up simultaneous radio-TV hook-ups in an effort to 
centralize and filter the information flow. Members present approve the 
recommendation (T). Hie mayor amends the approval and asks the director 
to assume responsibility for mobilizing the media pool. The director 
accepts. Forty minutes following the town meeting resources are 
mobilized. The director contacts the manager or owner of every local 
radio and TV station (R). Each proceed to the Civic Center which is 
also serving as the Central Flood Control Center. Here, the media pool 
is established (D). The director presents station representatives with
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the need for consistent publicized information regarding evacuation 
procedures. They discuss types of activities which could best 
accomplish this objective. Within an hour of their arrival at the 
Control Center, response activities begin. Newspersons are broadcasting 
public information over radio and TV from the centralized location (A). 
Broadcasts are hourly during the first few days of operation. Ihe 
frequency of broadcasts are gradually decreased and end when the 
evacuation process is over.
APPENDIX 3: Coding System
Item; Variable label Columns
Organized disaster response nurnh^ r? respw 
Event nunber; EVENTN
4 (1-4)
2 (5-6)
Event type; EVENTTP 2 (7-8)
1 = earthquake
2 = tornado
3 = flood
4 = hurricane
Activity type; ACTN 2 (9-10)
1 = hazard-jvulnerability analysis
2 = maintenance of standby human and
material resources
3 = disaster preparedness, planning, and
training
4 = public education
5 = hazard mitigation-structural
6 = hazard mitigation-nonstructural
7 = insurance
8 = issuance of predictions and warnings
9 = dissemination of predictions and warnings
10 = evacuation
11 = mobilization of emergency personnel
and resources
12 = protective action
13 = search and rescue
14 = medical care
15 = providing victim basic needs
(food, clothing, shelter)
16 = damage and needs assessments and
inventory of available resources
17 = damage control
18 = restoration of essential public services
19 = public information
20 = traffic control
21 = law enforcement
22 = local governance
23 = coordination and control (organization of
emergency personnel and resources)
24 = reconstruction of physical structures
25 = re-establishment of production, distribution,
and consumption activities (economic functioning)
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26 = resumption of other social institutions
27 = determination of responsibility and legal
liability for the event
28 = other
Activity pattern type; ORG-PAT 2 (11-12)
1 = D T R A
2 = D T A R
3 = D R A T
4 = D R T A
5 = D A T R
6 = D A R T
7 = T R A D
8 = T R D A
9 = T A D R
10 = T A R D
11 = T D R A
12 = T D A R
13 = R A D T
14 = R A T D
15 = R D T A
16 = R D A T
17 = R T D A
18 = R T A D
19 S= A D T R
20 = A D R T
21 = A T D R
22 = A T R D
23 = A R D T
24 = A R T D
Total time of response; TTR 4 (18-21)
days
9999 = missing value 
Social linkages to dominant activity areas; SLDA 1 (22)
1 = few if any, socially isolated
2 = several, strongly interrelated with
dominant activity area
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Initiation of organized disaster response: PINT 1 (23)
1 = self-contained
2 = boundary spanning, local
3 = boundary spanning, state
4 = boundary spanning, national
5 = boundary spanning-mixed local and state
6 = boundary spanning-mixed local and national
7 = boundary spanning-mixed state and national
8 = boundary spanning-mixed local, state, and national
9 = uncertain
Nuirber of, organizational links at, initiation; INLINKS 1 (25)
0 = none 
1 = 1 - 3
2 = more than 3
3 = uncertain
Physical location relative to primary- impact;___ELEI 1 (26)
1 = close
2 = peripheral
Factors drawn upon by participants to sustain conmunication 
among participants and relevent others . . .
Victim losses,, emotional:__LOSSl. 1 (28)
1 = no
2 = yes
Victim losses, structural or material: LOS52 1 (29)
1 = no
2 = yes
Overall community damages CDMGE 1 (30)
1 = no
2 = yes
Participant control of response: OOMQON 1 (31)
1 = no
2 = yes
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■Sl£^thy_for_ ptb e r sj ^ P
1 = no
2 = yes
Domain establishment at initiation: DESTAB
1 = established by participants then
legitimated by relevant others
2 = established by relevant others then
legitimated by participants 
9 = uncertain
Domain definition problems; DDPR
1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
Response task structure; RTSTR
1 = simple
2 = complex
9 = uncertain
Task Structure focus at initiation; RTSTRF
1 = no
2 = yesf physically
3 = yes, socially
4 = yes, temporally
5 = yes, mixed-physically and socially
6 = yes, mixed-physically and temporally
7 = yes, mixed-socially and temporally
8 = yes, mixed-physically,socially,temporally
9 = uncertain
Task definition problems: TDFR
1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
1 (32)
1 (33)
1 (37)
1 (38)
1 (39)
1 (49)
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Task structure development; TDEV
1 = tasks developed by participants
2 = tasks developed by relevant other (s)
then incorporated by participants 
9 = uncertain
Resource mobilization problems; RMPR
1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
Key resource at initiation; kfvres
1 = usable human attributes
2 = money
3 = equipment, tools
4 = information from other resonding units 
9 = uncertain
Activities performance problems; APPR
1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
Reason for suspension: POSP
1 = no
2 = yes
Response suspended due to loss or depletion 
of human or material resources; RSUSP-L
1 = no
2 = yes
Response absorbed bv another entity, designated 
and legitimated by participants; RSUSP-DL
1 = no
2 = yes
1 (50)
1 (54)
1 (59)
1 (60)
1 (66)
1 (67)
1 (68)
83
Response absorbed by, another entity, after 
resistance, by^particjpantsj ggUgPr^ L.
1 = no
2 = yes
Response absorbed.by, another entity after 
resistance bv absorbing entity: RSUSF-A2
1 = no
2 = yes
Response absorbed bv another entity as 
designated by a_ third party: R5USP-A3
1 = no
2 = yes
Response not suspended at interviews NRSUSP
1 = no
2 = yes
Reason for suspension uncertains RSUSPU
1 = no
2 = yes
Indication of reconstruction at maintenance: RECON
1 = no
2 = yes
9 = uncertain
Size of focal organization:__SI£
1 = 9 or fewer
2 = 10 to 20
3 = 21 to 50
4 = over 50 members
9 = uncertain
Community disaster experience in past 10 years; OEXP
1 = no disastersf few if any threats
2 = no disasters, several threats
3 = one or more disasters
4 = one or more disasters and several threats
9 = uncertain
1 (69)
1 (70)
1 (71)
1 (72)
1 (73)
1 (74)
1 (75)
1 (76)
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Comnunitv (rural-urban); QQMM 1 (77)
1 = rural area
2 = urban 10,000 or less
3 = urban 10r000 to 25,000
4 = urban 25,000 to 50,000
5 = urban metropolitan, 50,000+
Response location relative to military 1 (78)
resources: LOCMIL
1 = at some distance from military bases
and supplies
2 = military bases and supplies in close
proximity but not relevant to response
3 - military bases and supplies in close
proximity and relevant to response 
9 = relevance to response uncertain 
Type of focal organization: _FOT 1 (79)
0 = emergent groups of other groups
and organizations
1 = emergent groups of individuals
Maintenance of organized response: FMSTT 1 (1)
1 = self-contained
2 = boundary spanning local
3 = boundary spanning state
4 = boundary spanning national
5 = boundary spanning-mixed local and state
6 = boundary spanning-mixed local and national
7 = boundary spanning-mixed state and national
8 = boundary spanning-mixed local,state,national
9 = uncertain
Number of organizational links at maintenance: MNLINKS 1 (3)
0 = none
1 = 1 - 3
3 = more than 3 
9 = uncertain
Time of initiation: TINT 1 (4)
0 = pre-impact 72+
1 = pre-impact -72
2 = 1 to 2 hours post-impact
3 = 3 to 24 hours post-impact
4 = 25 to 72 hours post-impact
5 = beyond 72 hours post-impact
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